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AN ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN BARRIERS TO TBAHAtP'S EXPORTS
I. intrcpuction
There have been many discussions of hew the world economy 
has fallen into the grip of protectionism. Except for the decades 
immediately following World War II, protectionism has been a constant 
feature of modem economic history. Economists, believing in 
international comparative advantage and the gains from liberal 
international trade arrangements, have opposed restrictive trade 
measures. Though seme battles have been won, the war against 
protectionism is not over, and in the near future protection could 
become even stronger.
Increased protectionism was sparked most recently by the oil 
crises of the 1970s and the prolonged world economic recession of the 
early 1980s. Developed countries had to struggle to solve macroeconomic 
problems. Among the major OECD nations, the US assumed the most active 
role, in particular, undertaking initiatives dealing with exchange and 
interest rate problems. Both Japan and the EEC reluctantly took part, 
but lack of coordination among OECD countries led to many problems, 
further complicating the fundamental problem of structural adjustment in 
an increasingly integrated and competitive world econory.
As the major economic powers faced slower economic growth 
and often greater trade deficits, they resorted to protecting domestic 
industries. Politicians have found the world economic environment 
conducive to promoting new trade barriers. 1/ Instead of placing blame 
on declining competitiveness and low productivity, politicians and 
pressure groups have placed the blame on the global trading system and 
unfair foreign trade practices, pointing to imports as the main reason
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for poor domestic economic performance. Thus, over the last few years 
the US, EC and other developed countries have chosen to erect increased 
numbers of import barriers.
From a statistical standpoint, multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTNs) , held under the auspices of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , have been quite successful. After eight 
successive rounds of negotiations frcm 1947 to the conclusion of the 
Tokyo Round in 1979, US tariff rates, for example, have declined 
substantially to a level today about 21.2 per cent lcwer than the level 
of U.S. duties prevailing in the 1930s. (See Table 1.)
The same conclusion can be drawn in the cases of the EEC and 
Japan, as illustrated in Table 2 which summarizes pre- and post-Tokyo 
Round tariff averages. Though discrimination against processed goods 
remains, average tariff rate levels in Japan and the EEC are low, 
rivaling those in the US. However, rising non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to 
international trade have more than offset these reductions in nominal 
tariff rates. According to the World Bank, the extent of NIBs more than 
doubled in the US between 1980 and 1983, and rose by almost 40 per cent 
in the EEC. 2/ While few studies examine the extent of NTBs and their 
possible impacts on developing countries, this study attempts to 
identify the extent of NIBs against Thailand's exports and to assess 
their impact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II provides an overview of the tariff and non-tariff barriers facing 
Thai exports to the major industrial countries based on information made 
available by UNCTAD and the Thai Ministry of Camrrerce. Case studies
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Table l. Duty Reductions under tne u.s Trade Agreements Program
GATT Conference
Proportion of 
Dutiable Inports 
Subjected to 
Reductions
Average Cut in 
Reduced Tariffs
Average Cut in 
All Duties
Remaining Duties 
As a Proportion 
of 1930 Tariffs a/
1. Pre-GATT 
1934-47
63.9% 44.0% 33.2% 66.8%
2. First Round, 
Geneva, 1947
53.6 35.0 21.1 52.7
3. Second Round, 
Annecy, 1949
5.6 35.1 1.9 51.7
4. Third Round, 
Torquay, 
1950-51
11.7 26.0 3.0 50.1
5. Fourth Round, 
Geneva, 
1955-56
16.0 15.6 3.5 48.9
6. Dillon Round 
Geneva, 
1961-62
20.0 12.0 2.4 47.7
7. Kennedy Round, 
1964-67
79.2 45.5 36.0 30.5
8. Tokyo Round, 
1974-79
n.a. n.a. 29.6 21.2
Source: Real P. Lavergine, The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Qnpirical
Analysis. New York, Academic Press, 1983.
a/ These percentages do not take account of the effects of structural changes in trade or 
inflation on the average tariff level.
Table 2
Average Inport Duties in Industrial Countries 
Before and After Tokyo Round
US Japan EEC
1979 1985 1979 1985 1979 1.985
Raw Materials a/ 0.7 0.2 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.1
Semi-Manufacture 4.4 3.0 6.5 4.5 5.5 4.1
Manufacture 8.1 5.6 12.4 5.9 9.7 6.8
All products a/ 6.3 4.3 5.4 2.7 6.5 -4.6
a/ Excluding petroleum.
Note: Duty Rates based on 1977 trade weights.
Source: The World Bank, Thailand Country Economic Report 1986.
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identifying NTBs faced by particular products are reported in Section
III. Included in this analysis are 1) rice, 2) garments, 3) sugar, 4) 
tapioca, 5) frozen marine products and 6) boneless chicken. These 
products are of significance to Thailand in terms of export earnings; 
they are also airong the principal Thai products exported to the US, EEC 
and Japan. To avoid giving a biased picture, Section IV gives an account 
of trade barriers existing in the ASEAN countries, which are among 
Thailand's principal developing country trading partners. The 
concluding section surrrnarizes the findings of the study and suggests 
sane remedial actions to be taken at the multilateral, regional and 
national levels.
II. TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IN INDUSTRIAL CDUNTRTES
In order to present the overall picture of the tariff and 
non-tariff barriers faced by Thai exports, we rely on two sets of data 
made available by UNCTAD and the Ministry of Commerce of Thailand. The 
UNCTAD data are presented in Table 3. The data from the Ministry of 
Commerce are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Both data sets were ccfipiled 
from 1984 data.
The UNCTAD data cover all CCCN chapters. All chapters face 
both tariffs and NTBs, and many chapters additionally face specific 
tariffs. While the information indicates only the occurrence, and not 
the restrictiveness of specific tariffs and NTBs, the tariff rate data 
reveal that tariffs in excess of 40 per cent are frequently encountered 
by Thar exports of agricultural products and manufactures in the irerkets 
of the industrial countries.
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Table 3
Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers Facing Principal 
Thai Exports in Industrial Countries
CCCN Category
Average 
Ad Valorem 
Tariff Rate (%) Tariffs
Specific
NTBs
03 Fish 60.0 * ★ ★
07 Vegetables 50.0 * **
08 Oranges 60.0 *
09 Coffee 42.5 *
10 Wheat ★
12 Prepared vegetables and fruits 46.9 a
15 Margarine and shortening 15.0 *
17 Sugar 53.3 a **
19 Prepared food 80.0 *
20 Processed vegetables and fruits 80.0 A **
22 Alcoholic beverages 60.0 A
23 Flours and meals of meat and offal 0.0
25 Natural calcium phosphate 3.0
26 Ore concentrates 3.0 **
27 Briquettes 16.7 A **
29 Acyclic hydrocarbon 19.5 *
33 Essential oils, perfume 70.0 *
37 Chemical products 15.0 A
44 Fuel wood 24.3 A *★
47 Pulp and waste paper 1.0 **
48 Paper and paperboard 30.0 A
49 Printed matter 17.3 A
50 Silk 21.4
55 Cotton 66.7 A **
57 Jute 30.0 **
58 Pile fabrics and chenille 80.0 A *★
59 Felt and articles 30.0
62 Made-up textile articles 52.5 A
66 Umbrellas and sunshades 65.0 A68 Building and monumental stone 80.0 A69 Clay construction materials 70.7 A **73 Iron and steel 11.8 A80 Tin 13.883 Locksmith's wares 60.0 A **84 Steam boilers 12.285 Electric motors 22.587 Motor vehicles 46.090 Optical instruments 30.0 A *★97 Toys 30.0 A **
Source: UNCTAD, Manufactures Division, 1986.
Note: Average tariff rates are weighted by 1984 Thai exports.
The Thai Ministry of Commerce data have been broken down 
into tariff and nan—tariff measures. Unlike the UNCTAD data, the 
Ministry of Cormierce data are reported by major foreign markets, namely, 
Japan, EEC and the US. Another difference is that they include GSP 
rates applicable to Thai products. The MEN and GSP duty rates in Table 
4 indicate that tariff rates applicable to Thai products are lew, in 
particular because GSP duty rates are considerably lower than the 
average tariff rates in Table 3.
Turning to the information provided in Table 5, it is 
apparent that the US imposes three types of NTBs: (a) internal
regulations and laws, (b) quotas and (c) tariff quotas. It is difficult 
to suggest that regulations are inpediments to trade when the country in 
question attempts to establish and adhere to socially beneficial health, 
sanitary and similar regulations. Two Thai products facing US 
non-tariff barriers are canned tuna and sugar. Exports of canned tuna 
face tariff quotas, while sugar exports face both global and country 
quotas.
The EEC administration of non-tariff measures comprises 
mainly the application of quotas and a variable inport levy system. 
Canned pineapple faces duties on its content of sugar, and thus the EEC 
inposes indirect tariffs on competitive agricultural goods. Rubber and 
leather products (COCN 40 and 42) face total value restrictions. And 
finally, apparel and clothing accessories (CCCN 61) face quotas 
established under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).
Japanese barriers to trade are considered to be administered 
in a very fluid manner and to be susceptible to change on short notice. 
Apart frcm global quotas and import levies, Japan tends to apply value
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Thble 4
Thriff Barriers cf the LB, EEC, and J^an for Selected Pradxte, 1984
axN Name MFN
TARIFF
JAT¥N
GEP am. M E
TARIFF
EEC
GEP GEN. M E
TARIFF
LEA
C£P
03 Fish crustacean 5-15% 4-9% 6-18% 4-7% free-18.1 10.5
07 Edible usgetsble - - - - - 0.5-15 c/lb
08 Edible fruit and rut - - - - 0.5 c/lb -
15 Prqp. cf neat, fish 5-15% 4-9% 6.1-30% 4-19% - 6-18.1 (ad.val)
17 Sirpr and ccnfecticnary 35-98% - 65-80% - - 0.012-2.9812 c/lb
20 Rrqp. cf veg. fruit plant 55% - - - 0.5 c/lb -
24 Ttbacoo ran 670201 355% - 23% 7% 12.75 c/lb -
40 Fibber and synthetics 6-24% free free-6.3% - 2.5 (ad.val) -
42 Articles cf leather 10-12.5% 5-6.25% 13.5% - 8 (acLval) -
50 Silk and silk vaste 8-12.5% free 5.1-9.4% - - 5 (acLval)
55 Gbfctm frae-14% ftee-7% free-12% - free-13.5 (ad.val) -
60 Knitted crocheted GD 11.2-16.8% 5.6-8.4% 12.5-15% - 21.30.3% -
61 Tpparel and clothing aoc 8-24% free-22.4% 11.1-15.5% - 16.7-40% -
64 Fbobwear 5-20% 10-15% 5.7-20% - 5-15 (acLval) 2.5-7.9 (acLval)
67 Ffeather articles 8-25% - 9.4-11.5% - - 12.5-31.2%
69 Ctranic procLcts - - 9% - 21.3% -
85 Electrical nnchinery 6% free 5.3% - - -
97 Ttys and gxrts equip. 8% free-^ 5% free-12.6% — 7.9-14.8% -
Sburoe: Thai Ministry o f Ctnneroe.
Table 5
Non-Tariff Barriers of the US/ EEC, and Japan Countries 
for Selected Products, 1984
CCCN NAME
USA
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
USA
Quota (Quantity)
03 FISH CRUSTACEAN
07 EDIBLE VEGETABLE
08 EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUT 
16 PREP. OF MEAT, FISH
Health and Sanitary Law 
Indole is set at the 
maximum for each item
Endrix is set 0.05 p.p.m. 
at the maximum
Global quota
17 SUGAR AND CONFECTIONARY Global quota
20 PREP. OF VEG. FRUIT 
PLANT
60 KNITTED CROCHETED (D
61 APPAREL AND CLOTHING 
ACC
64 FOOTWEAR
67 FEATHER ARTICLES
97 TOYS AND SPORTS 
EQUIPMENT
Tariff quota for Tuna 
& Sardine
- 6% for the amount 
not more than 20% of 
total US production
- 12.5% for the amount 
more than 20% of 
total US production
- 35% for tuna in 
water
Quota is set for each 
country of each import 
entry
ETA
Standard regulation 
Standard regulation
Standard regulation
Standard regulation
Health and Sanitary (Act FHSA) 
Substance (Act OPSA)
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Table 5 (Cont.)
CQCN NAME
EEC
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
EEC
Quota (quantity)
03 FISH CRUSTACEAN
16 PREP. OF MEAT, FISH
17 SUGAR AND CONFECTIONARY
20 PREP. OF VEG. FRUIT 
PLANT
24 TOBACCO ROM 670201
40 RUBBER AND SYNTHETICS
42 ARTICLES OF LEATHERS 
55 COTTON
60 KNITTED CROCHETED GD
61 APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACC 
64 FOOTWEAR
67 FEATHER ARTICLES 
69 CERAMIC PRODUCTS
85 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY
97 TOYS AND SPORTS
equipment
Global quota
Set minimum price on 
inport items
Inport Levy 
Inport requires 
commodity certificate
Inport Levy
Quota is set according 
to the agreed limits 
between Thailand and 
Japan
Ceiling under servei- 
lance of 1,200 tons
Ceiling under 3,238,600 
ECU. covering CCCN 40.11
Ceiling 2,940,000 ECU.
2,536.8 tons
Ceiling quota
991.5 (in 1,000 pieces)
1,156 (in 1,000 pieces)
Ceiling 519,000 ECU. 
covering all CCCN 64.01
Health and Sanitary 3,244,100 ECU. (Ceiling)
Ceiling under surveils 
of 2,935,800 ECU. 
covering all CCCN 69.08
Quota of 3,082,600 ECU. 
covered all CCCN 69.08 
Of THAILAND 1984
6,103,000 ECU. (all 
numbers)
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Table (Cont.)
CCCN NAME
JAPAN 
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
JAPAN 
Quota (quantity)
03 FISH CRUSTACEAN Control on quantity 
of production 
Global quota
Quota amount is varied 
for each importer
17 SUGAR AND 
CONFECTIONARY
Import Levy 
Internal Tax 
Domestic products will 
receive price support
20 TOBACCO ROM 670201 State trading 
Phytosanitary regulation
40 RURRER AND SYNTHETICS 49,718 Mil.Yen (monthly) 
control selected products)
42 ARTICT iF.S OF LEATHERS 5,053 Mil.Yen (daily 
control selected products)
55 COTTON 105 Mil.Yen (goods falling 
within chapter 55 of the 
CCCN Code; daily control 
and selected products)
60 KNITTED CROCHETED GD 818,618 Mil.Yen (prior 
all garment)
61 APPAREL AND CLOTHING 
ACC 2,272 Mil.Yen (daily control)
64 FOOTWEAR 276,115 dz. (monthly control)
67 FEATHER ARTirTES 1,444 Mil.Yen (daily 
control)
97 TOYS AND SPORTS EQUIP. 766-20, 943 Mil.Yen 
(monthly control)
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand.
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quotas based on monthly and even daily monitoring of imports. Also, 
Japan continues to discriminate among import suppliers. For example, US 
exports of chickens are levied a lcwer tariff rate than Thai exports of 
broilers.
Before proceeding to analyze selected Thai export products 
facing non-tariff barriers, it is appropriate to discuss the use of 
value quotas. Unlike quantity restrictions, value quotas work in favor 
of the quota-imposing country. Specifically, they tend to restrict the 
ability of exporters to raise prices, and they assist irrporting 
countries to monitor their balance of trade situation. Take Japan and 
the EEC as example. Both attempt to limit balance of payments outflows, 
and they scmstimes employ value quotas to limit outflows for specific 
lines of products to insure that deficits in sctne products will not be 
overwhelming. The value quota system also works well in the case of 
numerous suppliers carpeting to sell similar products. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the system has been adopted by many countries. Japan is 
believed to be the first nation to apply the system to administer daily 
as well as the monthly control of certain imports. The EEC system is 
still administered on an annual basis. In the future the value quota 
system may be adopted by many other countries and regions.
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III. CASE g'TTinTFBOF NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
The previous section has discussed the overall extent of 
protection in Thailand's principal export markets, presenting 
basic evidence of restrictive non—tariff barriers against Thai exports. 
This section presents six case studies concerning Thai products exported 
to the US, EEC and Japan. The six products are major export items of 
Thailand in terms of foreign exchange earnings and employment. Because 
many of the products face trade impediments in more than one country, it 
is unnecessary to proceed with the analysis on country-by-country basis. 
The six products examined are: (a) long-grain rice, (b) garments and
clothing, (c) sugar, (d) tapioca (or cassava) , (e) frozen marine
products, and (f) boneless chicken.
Rice
About 90 per cent of the world rice crop is produced and 
consumed in Asia. Most rice is consumed in the countries where it is 
grown. Since 1950, the proportion of total rice production traded 
internationally has averaged about 4 per cent (Table 6). Of the major 
world rice exporters, only Thailand has consistently maintained 
substantial exports, up to 4.5 million tons in recent years. Erstwhile 
traditional exporters, such as Burma and Viet Nam, have become only 
occasional importers. New exporters include Pakistan, People's Republic 
of China, Japan, Australia and the US. Many rice importing countries 
have became self-sufficient; these include South Korea and Indonesia.
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Table 6
Annual World Rice Production and World Rice Trade 
1950-54 to 1986 (Million Metric Tons, Milled Basis)
Period a
Annual ^ 
Production QExport
Exports as 
% of 
Production
Closing d 
Production 
Stock
Prices 0 
US$/tonne
1950-54 122.0 4.7 4 n.a. n.a.
1955-59 147.3 6.1 4 n.a. n.a.
1960-64 163.5 6.8 4 n.a. n.a.
1965-69 184.2 6.7 4 n.a. n.a.
1970-74 208.6 7.3 3 27.5 n.a.
1975-79 247.0 10.3 4 37.2 323
1980 265.0 11.9 4 44.3 435
1981 274.0 12.5 5 43.2 484
1982 282.0 11.2 4 45.0 294
1983 300.0 11.4 4 42.3 277
1984 312.0 12.6 4 44.4 252
1985 307.0 11.5 4 54.0 216
1986 1 316.0 11.7 4 54.7 210
a/ For the periods 1950-54 to 1975-79 the data is a simple average.
b/ Production data refer to the calendar year in which the entire harvest or
bulk of the harvest takes place.
cf Exports excclude re-exports of imported rice.
d/ Stocks (milled basis) at the end of the countries1 respective crop years
in the year stated.
ef Thai long grain rice, 5 per cent broken, for Bangkok.
ff Forecast.
Source. FAO, Food Outlook (various issues); USDA, Foreign Agricultural 
Circular, World Grain Situation and Outlook (various issues)
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The agricultural policies of two countries, the US and 
Japan, are examined here. The US Farm Security Act (1985) , which became 
effective on April 15, 1986, offers three types of subsidy to US
farmers. First, there are 'deficiency payments' to make up the 
difference between the world price and the much higher domestic producer 
target price. To qualify for this form of subsidy, farmers must agree 
not to use a certain percentage of their land. Second, at harvest time 
farmers may borrow fran the government1 s Ccrrmodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) at the 'loan rate' using their rice crop as collateral. If prices 
are 1 c m , farmers liquidate the loan by forfeiting the crop to the CCC, 
which then sells the crop at a loss. At year-end 1986 the CCC was 
holding 2 million tons of rice in stocks. Third, a 'loan marketing 
repayment rate' enables farmers to repay their loan at only a faction of 
the loan rate. 3/ This has the effect of setting a low price for US 
exports.
The effect of the third type of subsidy was felt by Thailand 
prior to the first announcement by the US Department of Agriculture 
establishing the 'world price' used in administering the Farm Act credit 
program. In April 1986, the long-grain rice price fell from US$ 280 to 
US$ 230. Subsequently, hcwever, the US Department of Agriculture 
announced the world price to be about US$ 215 per ton.
At first there was fear that Thai rice exports would decline below 4 
million tons, that is, considerably below the government's target 
quantity of 4.5 million tons for 1986. By November 1986, according to 
Min istry of Commerce officials, Thai rice exports were 4.3 million tons. 
Thus, the quantity of rice exports was not substantially affected by the 
US policy. The income loss resulting from US policy was calculated as
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equal to the loss due to the US induced fall in the rice price. Fran 
December 1985 to April 1986/ at least 1.2 million tons of rice were 
shipped out to customers; thereafter 3.1 million tons ware shipped until 
November 1986. Each of the 3.1 million tons received at least US? 40 
less than would have been the case at the beginning of the year. Thus, 
the estimated revenue loss to Thai rice exporters is about US$ 120 
million.
Though NTBs were not directly applied to Thai rice exports, 
it is clear that the US rice policy disrupted Thailand's earnings firm 
rice exports. The US gained no more than 300,000 tons of rice exports 
fron such a policy and at a very high cost to US tax payers. 4/
The agricultural policy of Japan also affects Thai rice 
exports. Japan maintains 100 per cent self-sufficiency in rice 
production even though its production cost is twice that of the world 
price. The most important barrier to rice imports in Japan is the high 
rate of subsidy given to Japanese rice farmers. Otsuka and Hayami 
calculate that the consumer loss and government costs of protecting 
Japanese rice producers are very high (Table 7) . 5/
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Table 7
Estimated Costs of Japan Rice Production Subsidies
Year
Consumer Loss 
(Y bill.)
Cost to Japanese 
Government (Y bill.)
1965 412 76
1970 646 262
1975 983 642
1976 1,746 610
1977 1,820 729
1978 1,929 701
1979 1,984 716
1980 1,818 567
Source: K. Otsuka and Y. Hayami, 1986, "Revealed Preference in Japan's 
Rice Policy", in Kyun Anderson and Yukiro Hayami, eds., The 
Political Economy of Agricultural Protection, University of
Hawaii Press.
Otsuka and Hayami also content that in the absence of subsidies to rice 
growers (estimated to exceed 200 per cent) , Japan would have inported 
between one and two million tons of rice annually in the late 1970s. 
Both Thai and US rice exporters feel that the Japanese rice policy is 
restricting international trade in rice.
Though it cannot be stated enphatically that both the US and 
Japan moose tariffs and non-tariff measures that affect Thai rice 
exports directly, the subsidy programs of the two countries have 
significantly reduced Thai export earnings.
Garments
Since the mid-1970s international trade of apparel and 
clothing has been conducted outside of GATT rules under the Multi-Fibre
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Arrangement (MFA) , which involves bilateral negotiations to set quotas 
covering imports of textiles and apparel by the major industrial 
countries (excluding Japan) frcm less developed countries.
Considerable trade of garments is conducted between 
developed countries. At the same time, lirports of garments from 
developing countries have increased their market share in developed 
countries substantially. Major exporters include Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
South Korea, Brazil, Singapore and China. This group is seme times 
regarded as the first tier of the suppliers. Other exporters include 
the Philippines, Pakistan, India, and Thailand. In general, each of the 
large suppliers holds more than 10 per cent market share of each major 
market. By comparison, the second-tier producers hold less than 2 to 3 
per cent.
A recent study by Jaleel Ahmad of the North American textile 
and garment industry concludes that significant employment losses 
accompanied surges of apparel imports in the 1970s and 1980s. 6/ The 
underlying reason for such job displacement was increased use of capital 
in place of labor and attempts by industry to maintain productivity 
through other labor-saving techniques. Because reduced employment 
occurred at the time of the import surges, liberal import policies have 
been held responsible. The same conclusion is reached by European 
firms.
Both the US and EEC are MFA signatories. They, however, 
differ in their approaches to curbing imports of garments. In the case 
of the US, controls on the imports are mainly quotas set by agreement 
between the US and exporting countries. Each exporting country 
negotiates export limits with the US Department of Ccamerce covering (a)
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total yardage and (b) "specific limit" items. Since the total yardage 
is controlled non-specific limit items are generally automatically 
controlled. Authorities in exporting countries administer the issuance 
of export licenses and related documents, such as certificates of 
origin. Thus, MEA restrictions are in effect voluntary export
restraints (VERs).
The Thai-US textile agreement follows the framework set by 
the MFA. In general, Thai exports account for less than 2 per cent of 
the total US market. In 1984, the US Department of Coirmerce initiated a 
countervailing duty suit investigation against Thai textile mill 
products under Section 303 of the US Trade Law after a petition was 
filed by US firms. The US International Trade Ccnmission (USITC) found 
that Thai textile and garment exporters received subsidies from 
government export credit facilities. Textile exporters agreed to cease 
accepting subsidies, and garment exporters were levied a countervailing 
duty (CVD) of 1.23 per cent at the end of the investigation. Beginning 
in September 1985, the US embargoed all Thai garment exports to the US 
because they had exceeded MFA limits by 23 million square yards. 1] The 
eirbargo was lifted in late-1985 only after the Thai-US agreement was 
renegotiated to include a clause stipulating compensatory reduced quota 
allotments for the years 1986-88 to "payback" the 1985 overshipments. 
Notably, the US embargo came when the Jenkins Bill to restrict the 
growth of US textile iirports sharply was being debated in the US 
Congress.
It is difficult to estimate the loss due to the inposition 
of the 1.23 per cent countervailing duty on garments. However, the 
later tenporary US embargo sent many exporting firms out of business
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because they could not deliver their products on time. The Thai Garment 
Manufacturers Association put the number of firms which went out of 
business at 40, but the true figure m a y  be as lew as 10 given that a 
number of firms were financially unsound prior to the embargo of 1985. 
Nevertheless, the embargo adversely affected Thailand because it 
significantly disrupted Thai apparel production for seme months in 1985, 
and threatened to result in extensive factory shutdowns and massive 
layoffs.
The EEC textile agreements with Thailand are also based on 
the MFA framework. Each EC nation signs a separate agreement with 
Thailand stating the quota limit for each product line. We have 
analyzed Thailand's rate of quota utilization and found that Thai 
exporters neglect sane markets and only fill seme product lines. The 
rate of utilization of the US quota is higher than that of the EC 
countries. And the utilization of export quotas to Denmark is below 20 
per cent in many years. The rates of utilization are better in the case 
of Germany, UK and Italy (Table 8).
The EEC has not applied countervailing duties to Thai 
garment exports. However, in 1981 the EEC established an administrative 
mechanism to prevent surges of ASEAN textile exports. The anti-surge 
mechanism provided an instrument to check the growth of irrports apart 
fran regular MFA consultations. In response, ASEAN formed a coalition 
that successfully negotiated the removal of the anti-surge mechanism. 8/
Finally, it should be emphasized that the MFA system favors 
established firms because the allocation of licenses is based primarily 
on historical sales performance of firms. Therefore, new firms are 
effectively barred fran entry unless export regulations specifically
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■Mile 8
Thailand Experts c f  'textiles and (ternents to EEC, 1983-1985 
(Square Yards)
Gantry
CtntroL IteteL Quantity Bqparted fete cf Utilization
1983 1584 1985 1983 1984 1985 1983 1984 1985
Baelm 8,515.766 5,106.437 9,013.925 6,660.538 7,251.841 6,743.767 78.18 79.63 74.81
CBTTBTk 5,592.766 6,663.750 6,414.591 2,524.227 3,618.298 3,941.975 45.13 54.30 61.45
France 8,173.170 5,605.287 9,977.487 4,839.272 5,571.173 5,928.965 59.21 58.00 59.42
(ternary (ttest) 26,865.582 28,604.869 28,197.565 22,493.790 24,697.169 23,649.457 83.73 86.34 83.87
Qeace 349.000 408.179 479.330 47,650 42.572 48.191 13.65 10.43 10.00
Irelafl 590.185 636.946 664.245 441.024 381.695 370.161 70.15 59.93 55.70
Italy 14,836.502 15,848.640 15,607.158 10,023.901 10,517.835 10,548.067 67.56 66.36 67.50
thited Kingim 15,035.524 16,042.402 16,376.156 10,786.833 10,996.226 10,924.969 71.74 68.54 66.70
Source: DpartrrEnt cf Fbreiga Ttada, Ministry cf atrarerce, Thailand.
promote their entry. The system also creates excessive rent. 9/ The 
experience of Thailand is that rent-seeking occurs in the process of 
obtaining export licenses and that rents are shared unequally among 
exporters, importers and seme officials.
Survey Results. To assess the potential effects of the 
rising tide of protectionism, a survey of garment exporters was 
conducted during November and December 1985, at which time the likely 
impacts of the Jenkins Bill could only be speculative. Frcm a list of 
259 exporters, supplied by the Thai Garment Manufacturers Association, 
70 firms were selected at randan and sent a questionnaire. Though 
follcw-up interviews were conducted, many firms refused interviews. 
Thus, the final sample size was 28 firms. The sarrple firms have 
registered capital ranging frcm 0.6 million baht to 80 million baht, 
with the majority of firms (about 82 per cent) having registered capital 
of less than 20 million baht. Of the 28 firms, 18 firms are Thai-owned 
and the rest are joint-ventures between Thai and foreign investors, 
principally from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Foreign equity participation is 
in general less than 80 per cent except in two cases.
The Thai garment industry is a mixture of old and new firms. 
Of the interviewed firms, 15 were established in the 1970s, and 11 were 
established over the period 1978-1984. Though precise information about 
capital machinery usage is unavailable, plant visits revealed that 
joint-ventures tend to be more capital intensive than Thai-owned firms. 
The value of equipment per worker in local firms is estimated to be 
about 15,000. baht while that in joint-ventures is estimated to be 
somewhat over 20,000 baht.
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Table 9
Export Marketing Channels of Thai Garment Firms Surveyed
, a/ Percent —
Single channel ^6
Multiple channels 4^
Sub-contracting 50
Foreign partner marketing 7
Trading companies 18
CWn marketing effort 61
Others (e.g., sales agents) 32
a/ Percentages do not add up to 100 per cent.
Of the firms surveyed, 36 per cent rely on only one type of 
marketing effort or sales channel (Table 9) . However, most firms use 
several strategies to sell their products abroad. About 60 per cent of 
the firms rely on their own marketing efforts rather than agents or 
other intermediaries. Half of the firms are involved in sub-contracted 
work for companies located in importing countries, a practice which is 
common in the garment industry.
The firms were asked to identify their nearest competitors 
in the product range that they export. Four countries were most 
frequently mentioned: Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and China.
However, ASEAN and South Asian countries were scare tines included in the 
lists, perhaps illustrating that Thai garment exports are wide ranging 
across spectra of garment types and qualities.
Thai garment exporters aim their products at North American 
and EEC markets predominantly. Every firm surveyed irentioned that trade 
iirpediments were encountered in the US, Canada and the EEC. MFA quota
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restrictions were named as the most important, followed by tariffs. 
Notably, the firms understand the consequences of the MFA bilateral 
agreements well, and in particular recognized that the agreements were 
responsible for Thai Ministry of Corrmerce intervention to administer the
allocation of quotas.
Firms viewed the impact of the Jenkins Bill differently. 
Five firms did not foresee any change in their output or exports. 
Twelve firms anticipated losses to result, while nine firms were 
uncertain about the probable outcome. Only one firm expected to sell 
more.
It is difficult to assess the reliability of the responses 
regarding the impact of the Jenkins Bill, especially given the charged 
political climate in Thailand towards U.S. trade policy, at the time of 
the survey. If simple averages of responses are accepted, then the 
respondent firms expected that production would be reduced by 35 per 
cent from the previous year (1985) , raw-materials usage by 31 per cent, 
eirplcyment by 32 per cent, export sales by 34 per cent, and profits by 
19 per cent. Even these estimates may be overly pessimistic. But, they 
accurately reflect that the Jenkins Bill created considerable 
uncertainly among exporters, and this uncertainly cannot be emphasized 
too strongly here.
Finally, the survey indicated how Thai firms expected to 
cope with foreign trade restrictions (Table 10). In the short-run, they 
expected either to reduce production or to seek assistance from the 
government. In the long-run, they expected to tend to switch to other 
markets, to improve their productivity and quality, or to move to 
produce higher value-added items.
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Table 10
Garment Firms' Adjustment to Foreign Trade Restrictions
Short-Term Long-Term
1. Reduce production and 1. Seek new markets
employment
2. Seek assistance frcm the 2. Improve productivity and
Thai Government quality of product
3. Move to high-value items
4. Move to high-end items
5. Substitute local for imported
raw materials
Sugar
Sugar is produced by many countries around the world. In
Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand are major exporters.
Hcwever, Latin America and Caribbean countries, including Cuba, dominate 
global production. In Europe, where beet sugar is produced, sugar is 
produced at a higher cost and continues to receive subsidies frcm the 
EEC Cannon Agricultural Policy. The world consumption of sugar, on the 
other hand, is dominated by the US where, hcwever, sugar is gradually 
being replaced by other sweeteners because of the relatively high price
maintained for sugar through the US system of domestic irarket price
supports and import controls.
In the US, between 1976 and 1985 tariff duties on sugar 
imports were raised on several occasions when the world sugar price 
weakened. During this period, US irrports of Thai sugar were accorded
25
preferential treatment under the US GSP scheme, which excludes any 
beneficiary country once imports frctn the country reach 50 per cent of 
total U.S. imports in any year. Unlike the EC GSP scheme, the US 
exclusion principle rules out further future imports under the GSP 
scheme. Thus, Thailand could export up to about 800,000 tons of sugar
to the US and still enjoy GSP treatment.
In the Summer of 1980, because of the trebling of the spot 
price over the previous forward price, large quantities of Thai, sugar 
were delivered to the US and the 50 per cent limit was exceeded, 10/ 
automatically excluding Thai sugar exports frcxn the GSP scheme and 
requiring that future Thai sugar exports to the US be controlled by the 
U.S. global quota. Efforts to restore Thai sugar exports under the GSP 
have failed since 1984. At present, Thai sugar exporters export 12 
million tons of raw sugar valued at 6,000 to 8,000 million baht. Of the 
12 million tons, only about 29,000 tons new enter the US each year. 
This volume represents one-tenth of the previous volume under the GSP 
scheme, and consequently Thailand has lost about 3 billion baht in sales 
to US market. 11/
In the EC, the Secretariat has set the tariff rate on sugar 
at 80 per cent and has excluded sugar from the EC GSP scheme. In 
addition, a variable levy is imposed on products that use sugar. For an 
example, canned pineapple is levied several tariff rates, depending on 
sugar content. The EC also intervenes in sugar production and export. 
Through an export subsidy program, sugar is subsidized 400 ECU per ton, 
thus contributing to the lew world price of sugar. In fact, without the 
EC subsidy program, the world sugar price might have been much higher in 
recent years. Thus, so long as the EC continues to pursue its Cannon
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Agriculture Policy (CAP), the world sugar trade will continue to suffer. 
The 1985 Wold Development Report, published by the World Bank, estimates 
that OECD policies have reduced developing countries income several 
billion dollars. In the Thai case, the US policy has cost billions of 
baht, and EC actions in the last few years have contributed 
significantly to the serious deterioration of the terms of trade faced 
by Thai sugar exporters in world markets.
Tapioca
World production of tapioca is concentrated in a handful of 
tropic zone countries: Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, China and Viet Nam.
Tapioca in pellet form is used for animal feed in many countries, 
including the EC, South Korea and the Soviet Union. Thailand is the 
dominate - world producer and exporter, with annual production of 20 
million tons and pellet exports of about 5 million tons.
As a raw-material for the animal feed industry, tapioca has 
many substitutes, including all coarse grains and especially com. Scire 
experts estimate that within the EC countries the price of com is 40 
per cent higher than the price of irrported tapioca. In 1977, after many 
years of importing tapioca, the EC decided to regulate imports of 
tapioca frcm Thailand. The first of several bilateral agreements 
between Thailand and the EC was signed in 1977. The period of the most 
recent agreement is 1987-89.
The agreements are essentially voluntary export restraints 
(VERs). Under the agreements Thailand’s Department of Foreign Trade of 
the Ministry of Comrerce regulates exports of tapioca pellets to the EC. 
Exporters are required by the Export-Inport Law of Thailand (B.E. 2522)
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to obtain a license to export, along with a certificate of origin. The 
VER gives rise to abnormal rents garnered by license holders. In recent 
years, the Ministry of Commerce has instituted a 'special bonus scheme 
to encourage exports of tapioca to non-agreement countries in return for 
'special' quota allotments for the EC market. Thus, Thai exporters have 
increased their sales to South Korea and the Soviet Union to obtain 
larger EC quotas.. Recently, hcwever, Airmar Siamwalla analyzed the 
' special bonus1 scheme and concluded that Thailand has dissipated her 
economic rent to non-agreement countries, mainly because in 
non-agreement countries Thai exporters had to sell tapioca below the 
world price of yellow com to attract buyers. 12/
Two long-standing pertinent questions about Thai tapioca 
trade are: (a) would free trade in tapioca benefit Thailand and (b)
what ‘ is the present benefit to Thailand? Because Thailand is the 
largest exporter of the product and the EC is the largest buyer of the 
product, free trade might result in a bilateral monopoly situation in 
which both sides would have to agree on the price and quantity traded. 
At the same tine, it must be realized that the present Thai export price 
of tapioca is only lower than the EC price of yellow com, not the world 
price. The EC could impose a tariff higher than 6 per cent (the present 
rate) and increase the cost of Thai tapioca to the EC animal feed 
industry easily. Therefore, free trade would be expected to boost the 
volume of Thai tapioca exports and reduce the EC price of tapioca, 
benefiting both Thailand and the EC.
The present benefit to Thailand of tapioca trade has been 
calculated by Chaiyaphun (Table 11). 13/ The study indicates that 
enormous economic rent is being generated by the VER on tapioca
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Table 11
Tapioca Export Earnings Under VER and Under Free Trade
($ millions)
Year
Under VER 
(1)
Under Free Trade 
(2)
Difference
(1-2)
1983 515.4 515.4 0
1984 515.4 515.4 0
1985 546.0 494.5 -51.5
1986 546.0 494.5 51.5
1987 553.5 439.8 113.7
1988 553.5 439.8 113.7
Total 3,229.8 2,899.4 330.4
Source: Chaiwoot Chaiyaphan, "VER between Thailand and the EEC: Inpact
and Effects, "Discussion Paper No. 2704, Faculty of Economics, 
Chulalongkom University, 1984 (in Thai).
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products. Many assure that this econanic rent is captured by Thai 
exporters, but surveys of exporters reveal that sere inporters are also 
benefitting as exclusive tapioca importers in the EC. Thus, it 
highly likely that, similar to other cases of VERs inposed on Thailand, 
economic rents are being enjoyed in different measures by importers, 
exporters and trade officials.
Frozen Marine Products 14/
Thailand's international trade of frozen marine products 
principally involve Japan because of the Japanese preference for fresh 
frozen seafood. Other important inporters are the EC (particularly 
Italy) and the U.S. Thailand's main overseas corpetitors for these 
markets are the Maldives, South Pacific island countries and sere Latin 
American countries. - Specific products vary with the importing country's 
taste. Baby clams are the prire export product for Italy; shrimps for 
the U.S.; and a wide variety of seafood for Japan.
The production of frozen marine products is a two-stage 
process: (a) catching seafood and then (b) freezing and processing of
the product. Whereas investment in the first stage is undertaken by 
nany countries involved in deep sea fishing, investment in cold storage 
facilities is usually undertaken by local businessmen or through a 
j oint—venture with a Japanese ccrrpany. The development of frozen irarine 
production has been supported by Japanese companies in many countries, 
including for an example Indonesia and Peru. However, the Thai share of 
the Japanese market is sizable. In 1979, shrimps and prawns (CCCN 03) 
accounted for 43 per cent of the total value of Thai non-GSP exports to 
Japan, while cuttle fish of various species also enjoyed a substantial
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market share. Also, in Japan Thailand has benefitted from the tariff 
concessions agreed to at the Tokyo Round. The official tariff rate for 
frozen shrimps was reduced fran 5 per cent to 3 per cent level. That on 
frozen cuttle fish was reduced from 46 per cent to 5 per cent level, a 
tariff reduction of over 90 per cent.
Fran the viewpoint of Thai exporters of frozen marine 
products there are two kinds of trade impediments facing exports to 
Japan. Tne first is the overall policy of Japan to diversify its 
sources of suppliers in many countries. The second is the use of 
non-tariff measures, often in combination with one another, to curtail 
rapid export expansion to Japan.
The overall import policy of Japan has often been 
questioned. The Japanese system of distribution also presents barriers 
to foreign goods. In 1979, an Arthur D. Little report concluded that, 
"there is an instructive anti-import bias within the Japanese business 
community, and Japan is reluctant to became too dependent on any single
source for its vital supplies or its economic activities." 15/ The
reluctance to rely on one single source has led Japan to invest in
cold-storage around the Pacific region, weakening the position of 
competitive suppliers such as Thailand. Since 1970 Japan has agreed to 
import up to 7,000 tons of Thai frozen marine products annually, but in 
fact Japan has hardly imported more than 50 per cent of the agreed 
amount, even though Thai marine products meet Japanese quality standards 
and have been well received by the market.
Since the Tokyo Round negotiations and the accession of
Thailand to the GAIT in 1982, Japan has established other non-tariff 
measures that further hinder Thai exports of frozen marine products to
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Japan. Included in these measures are quotas based on value, daily or 
monthly monitoring systems, and sanitation regulations and laws. The 
value quota is used to limit yen outflows and the size of trade deficits 
of frozen marine products. It also tends to depress prices quoted by 
exporters.
Even more complex are quotas regulating inports on a daily 
or monthly basis. Thai exports that cannot be shipped or imported in 
time are destroyed, adding to costs and reducing demand. Japan also 
introduces special tariffs once the value of an import item has reached 
a given level. Exporters dislike such arrangements because information 
is typically not received prior to shipment.
Boneless Chicken
Thailand is a competitive producer and exporter of chickens, 
along with the U.S., Brazil, West Germany and the Philippines (Table 
12) . Middle East countries, China and Japan are the major markets for 
Thai exports of broiler chickens.
Japan imposes both ordinary and tariff quotas on imported 
chickens. Furthermore, Japan applies discrimiinatory import restrictions 
to chickens from different countries. In particular, the tariff rate 
levied on U.S. chickens is always lower than that levied on Thai 
boneless chicken, 13.8 per cent for Thai chickens versus 12.4 per cent 
for U.S. chickens. Thailand protested this discrimination, specifically 
arguing that discrimination against Thai broilers is uncalled for 
because U.S., not Thai, producers are the lowest cost suppliers.
The loss due to discrimination to Thai exports has not been 
estimated. The Thai chicken industry does not depend an one market for
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its exports. It can diversify to local market and other overseas 
markets. However, since the dollar devaluation of 1986, Thai exports of 
chickens to Japan have increased rapidly, and Japan has reduced the 
tariff rate applied to Thai chickens to be equal the rate applied to 
U.S. chickens. Thus, the case of boneless chicken has finally been 
solved to the mutual benefit of both Thailand and Japan.
Table 12
Price Per Kilogramme of Live Broiler Chickens 
in Selected Countries, 1983-1986
Local Currency US Dollar
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986 1983 1984 1985 1986
US 0.63 0.74 0.67 0.77 0.63 0.74 0.67 0.77
Germany 1.97 2.12 2.06 • • • • 0.77 0.75 0.70 ______
Thailand • • • • 17.26 15.80 18.40 • • • • 0.73 0.58 0.71
Mexico • • • • • • • • 274.35 404.55 
14.OO^7
• • • • • • • • 1.07 0.75Brazil • • • • • • • • 1266.00 • • • • • • • • 0.38 1.02
Philippines «... • • • • 20.53 21.03 • • • • • • • • 1.10 1.03
a./ Brazil devalued her currency in March 1986. 
Source: International Finance Corporation (1986) .
33
IV. TARIFFS AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS IN ASEAN
The above account of Thailand's problems with foreign tariff 
and non-tariff barriers suggests that protectionism is pervasive in the 
OECD countries. It is misleading, however, to suggest that only the 
developed economies impose tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
against developing countries. In fact, significant, if not rising, 
levels of protection are also present in developing countries.
A number of reasons may be given for protection in less 
developed countries, including the need for government revenues, import 
substitution policies, and balance of payments problems. Nevertheless, 
import barriers in the form of both tariffs and other measures are 
especially restrictive in many developing countries precisely to protect 
inefficient domestic industries fran foreign competition, including 
competition from efficient producers in other less developed countries.
To illustrate the extent and nature of tariff and non-tariff 
measures prevailing among developing countries, trade restrictions 
enforced within ASEAN are examined here. This is appropriate because 
Thailand is an ASEAN member country and the ASEAN countries are among 
Thailand's closest allies in Asia and the Pacific.
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has adopted many measures 
to foster economic cooperation. One of the most significant is the 
ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) adopted in 1977. Under the 
Arrangement, ASEAN countries agreed to reduce or eliminate the tariff 
rates on many items. Presently, Thailand has 1,885 customs product 
lines under which imports from other ASEAN countries are allowed entry 
at preferential duty rates. Studies by Naya and Guat Tin reviewing the
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results of PTA have found that intra-ASEAN trade has not progressed at a 
satisfactory rate hcwever. 16/ Moreover, a recent study by Reiger 
confirms that intra-ASEAN trade is dcminated by the entrepot trade of 
Singapore with both Malaysia and Indonesia. 17/ Whereas, intra-ASEAN 
trade is roughly 19 per cent of total ASEAN trade, 16 per cent of the 
total is attributed to trade with Singapore. Thus, "pure" intra-ASEAN 
trade is only about 3 per cent.
Intra-ASEAN trade is unlikely to progress faster than ASEAN 
trade with other countries mainly because of the large number of items 
still excluded frcm PTA and levied very high tariffs. Table 13 
illustrates the average tariff rates on cctrmodities and manufactures of 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore levied against Thai 
exports. It is apparent that, ASEAN countries enforce high tariff 
levels. Indonesia imposes the highest rates, followed by the 
Philippines. Malaysia's tariff rates are generally much lower, while 
Singapore inposes few tariffs at all.
There is also considerable evidence of restrictive NTBs 
applied in ASEAN. Table 14 shows the extent of NTBs in Malaysia and 
Singapore as recorded by the Thai Ministry of Cornierce. It is clear 
frcm the Malaysian case that several one-digit CCCN products are subject 
to licensing, even when, as indicated in Table 14, PTA rates have been 
negotiated. Malaysia requires licensing of many imports, while 
Singapore prohibits certain imports and generally applies a 
nondiscriminatory excise tax to all imports.
Ooi Guat Tin, through interviews with both exporters and 
customs officials in ASEAN, found that easterns procedures, including 
especially those involving the classification, valuation and clearance 
of goods, are a fundamental bottleneck to expanded intra-ASEAN trade. 25/ 
Indeed, her study demonstrates that customs procedures hinder imports of 
most traded items in ASEAN.
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Average Tariff Levels Enforced by ASEAN Countries
Table 13
CCCN NAME
INDONESIA PHILIPPINES MALAYSIA SINGAPORE
GEN.
RATE PTA 1983 1984 1985 PTA
GENERAL
RATE PTA
GENERAL
RATE PTA
03 FISH CRUSTACEAN 40% 25% 50% 50% 50% 20% free free _ _
07 EDIBLE VEGETABLE 60% 25% 30% 30% 30% 25% $984/t 30% - -
08 EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUT 60% 25% 50% 50% 50% - &881 70-85/t - - -
16 PREP OF MEAT FISH 70% - 10-50% 10-50% 10-50% 20% 20-30% free 30% - -
*17 SUGAR AND CONFECTIONARY 60% 25-30% 50% 50% 50% 20% $143 30 20-35% $30856/t $30856/t
20 PREP OF VEG FRUIT PLANT 50% - 60% 50% 50% 20% $2 20/kg - - -
24 TOBACCO ROM 670201 - 30-50% 30-50% - - - - - - -
40 RUBBER AND SYNTHETICS 40% 20% 10-30% 10-30% 10-30% 20% - - - -
42 ARTICLES OF LEATHERS 60% 25% 60% 50% 50% 20% 25% 20-30% 5% -
50 SILK AND SILK WASTE - - 40% 40% 40% 20% 25% - - -
55 COTTON 5-100% 20-25% 10-40% 10-40% 10-40% 10-20% - free 20% - -
60 KNITTED CROCHETED GD 70-80% - 70% 60% 50% 20% 25% 20% 5% 4%
61 APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACC 80% - 70% 60% 50% 20% 25-35% 20% 5% 3 75%
64 FOOTWEAR 40-70% - 20-60% 20-50% 20-50% 20% 25% 29% - -
67 FEAIHER ARTICLES 60% - 50% 50% 50% 20% 15-25% 20% - -
69 CERAMIC PRODUCTS 225% - 60% 50% 50% - 25% 20% - -
97 TOYS AND SPORTS EQUIPMENTS 50% 50% 50% 50% 20% 25%
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand.
Non-Tariff Barriers Enforced by Malaysia and Singapore, 1983
Table 14
CCCN NAME MALAYSIA
02 MEAT AND EDI. MEAT OFFAL Inport licensing 
Export licensing
020201 PCWL DUCKS FRESH FROZEN
03 FISH CRUSTACEAN Export licensing
05 ANIMAL PRODUCTS Eixport licensing
17
170101
SUGAR AND CONFECTIONARY 
RAW SUGAR CENTRIFUGA
All types of CCCN 1701 
Prohibited inport 
(subject to import 
licensing)
Excise taxes
Export licensing (to
protect local industry)
170102
170109
170111
BROWN RAW SUGAR 
OTHER RAW SUGAR 
WHITE REFINED SUGAR
170300 MOLASSES TRIC METER Inport licensing 
(Protect local industry)
19
190303
190801
PREP. OF CEREAL FLOUR 
RICE NOODLE VERMICEL 
BISCUITS AND CRACKERS
Export licensing 
Export licensing
20
200712
PREP. OF VEG. FRUIT PLANT 
GRPSUM CRUDE Export licensing
252301
252321
252329
WHITE CEMENT 
PORTLAND CEMENT 
OTHER CEMENT
Export licensing 
Export licensing 
Export licensing
64
640210
FOOTWEAR 
SPORT SHOES Etcport licensing (for 
security reasons)
69
690400
CERAMIC PRODUCTS 
CERAMIC BRICKS Export licensing
SINGAPORE
Prohibited inports 
(under inport 
licensing for 
security of supplies 
and price stability)
Excise tax ($163.54/t) 
Prohibited inports 
Excise tax ($163.54/t) 
Prohibited inports
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Table 14 (Cont)
CCCN NAME MALAYSIA SINGAPORE
85
851525
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 
RADIO RECEIVERS Import licensing (for 
security reasons) 
Excise taxes
851521
851920
COLOUR TV SETS 
CIRCUIT BREAKER PART Import licensing (for 
security reasons)
851911 INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
970301 OTHER WORKING MODELS Prohibited import
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Thailand.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
While protectionism has risen, jeopardizing the 
international trading environment, it is premature to think that nations 
will reduce their trade drastically in order to achieve self-reliance. 
Few countries in the world are capable of sustaining growth based on 
their own resources and technological kncwhcw, except at very high 
opportunity cost. Thus, both developed and developing countries have 
equal interests in preserving and strengthening the global trading 
system. In the past, little or passive participation of LDCs has been 
observed at the GATT negotiations and meetings. Developing countries 
have benefitted frcrn concessions previously negotiated at GATT, but now 
is the time for exploitation of the system in the form of "free-riding" 
to end. For instance, Krause contends that unless LDCs negotiate in the 
new GATT round the global trading system will became less favorable to 
IDCs. 18/
Within the Asian-Pacific region, there is a clear need to 
define and discuss the regional and global dimensions of problems with 
non-tariff measures restricting trade. The ASEAN countries, for 
instance, in connection with their 1987 summit in Manila will consider 
what market and trade arrangements among themselves would better promote 
intra-ASEAN trade. There has not been much discussion of NTBs within 
the ASEAN group. Because non-tariff barriers exist in ASEAN, any 
negotiations leading up to significant economic integration must include 
consideration of these measures and their adverse effects on intra-ASEAN 
trade. Similarly, any trade negotiations within the region must also 
focus on NTBs as well as other substantive issues.
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Thailand itself must also prepare to discuss restrictive 
trade measures with its trading partners. In the past, Thailand has 
imposed tariffs and NTBs without justification other than to respond to 
vested economic interests within the country. Import licensing, for 
example, has been used extensively by the Ministry of Commerce. 
Thailand has also tended to favor bilateral agreements to expand her 
exports. This tendency should not be overenphasized because it promotes 
discrimination and overlooks the fact that multilateral, or MFN 
arrangements are in the best interest of Thailand as well as other 
countries. In the final analysis, Thailand must be prepared to offer 
"concessions" to other countries in the form of reduced tariff and 
non-tariff barriers as well as to strive for greater access to foreign 
markets.
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